The abuse of entrusted power for private gain – be it money, material goods or status — is an ongoing and persistent problem in American politics. Scandals involving unethical behavior or financial improprieties by political figures can undermine public confidence in government and trigger calls for reform. These incidents also shape broader conversations about ethical governance and influence how future officials conduct themselves while in office.
Yet the transformation of misbehavior into scandal is more complicated than that. As Dziuda and Howell show, scandals are not just reflections of politicians’ private actions; the decision to expose such behavior is always a political calculus that weighs benefits and costs for each party in terms of electoral gains and losses. This partisan calculus explains why some politicians are exposed to the public while others’ bad behavior goes unnoticed – and how the presence of political polarization complicates voters’ ability to discern which misbehavior is worthy of their attention.
To test their main findings, Dziuda and Howell construct a model that simulates the dynamics of scandal-making within a political framework involving two parties and one elected official. They find that the higher the level of political polarization, the greater the incentive for one party to expose the misconduct of its rival and the more likely it is to throw baseless accusations based on partisan concerns. In addition, the model shows how the existence of polarization makes it easier for both parties to spread “fake news” along party lines and further confuse voters’ decision-making.